


















Australia’s relationship with Indonesia has been a bit like the 
board game “Snakes and Ladders”. Incremental progress in the 
relationship (up the ladder) is easily undone (down the snake) 
over a range of misunderstandings including issues like beef, 
boats, spies, clemency, Timor and Papua. Both countries have 
considerable overlapping interests. They both have to find a way 
to deepen and broaden the bilateral relationship to prevent this 
cycle from continuing to recur. In considering how to do that, 
understanding how they got here is important. Bilateral and 
multilateral engagement, on trade, education, and security 
including through IA-CEPA, links like the Ikahan network, 
additional New Colombo Plan engagement and a MANIS 




Geographically, Australia and Indonesia have always been, and always will be, 
neighbours, at the maritime fulcrum of the Indo-Pacific. Yet that does not 
automatically guarantee that they will be close friends or that they will 
understand each other well and support each other. That takes deliberate policy 
choices. Like siblings, these two nations have learnt to get along.  Yet there is so 
much more potential in the relationship than has been realised so far. There 
have been some bitter moments and some sweet ones. To understand how we 
may make progress, to make sweet the bilateral ties, a historical review of where 
the relationship has been so far may be helpful. This paper, surveys bilateral 
relations from 1945 to today and considers some of the ups and downs along the 
way. It then outlines some suggestions for how to deepen ties and bolster 
regional stability to aid in furthering mutual prosperity. 
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Australia committed forces for the defence of what is now Indonesia at the 
height of the Second World War, deploying troops to Ambon, Timor and Java 
in 1941 and 1942. Later, as the tide of war turned, they led the way in 
operations in Borneo, including the Battle of Balikpapan in 1945 (Long, 1973). 
After the war, Australia gave de-facto recognition of Indonesian Independence 
when it raised the matter of Indonesia’s decolonization in the United Nations in 
July 1947 (DFAT, 1949). In an act of solidarity with Indonesian independence 
fighters, Australian port workers in Darwin and other port cities launched 
industrial action against Dutch ships from 1945 to 1949. This came to be known 
as the “Black Armada” (Dalziel, 2020). 
In August 1947, a small Australian contingent deployed as military 
observers a part of the United Nations’ Good Offices Commission, remaining 
until Aril 1951 (Australian War Memorial, 1951). Thereafter, recognizing the 
importance of the future relationship, Australia was amongst the first countries 
to recognize formally Indonesian independence in 1949 (DFAT, 1949). 
As President Sukarno sought to consolidate power in the young 
democracy, his flirtation with the Communist Party of Indonesia in the early to 
mid-1960s caused concern, as did his rejection of Malaysian independence and 
his launch of Konfrontasi. Australia sided with Malaysia and Great Britain in 
defence against Indonesian incursions, but managed to keep diplomatic 
relations relatively stable regardless. The overthrow of Sukarno, and the 
establishment of the New Order under President Suharto led to the end of 
Konfrontasi and a new opening up of Indonesia. Reflecting this new approach, 
Indonesia was instrumental in the establishment of ASEAN in 1967 – an 
organisation which Australia has consistently supported. Reflecting this 
commitment, Australia became ASEAN’s first Dialogue Partner, a few years 
later in 1974 (DFAT, 2020). More recently, a Prime Ministerial ASEAN-
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Australia Summit sought to demonstrate enduring Australian commitment to 
the region and its representative body. 
Australia, meanwhile maintained its close security ties with Singapore 
and Malaysia, notably through the Five Power Defence Arrangement 
established in 1971. The FPDA, including the United Kingdom, Australia, New 
Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore, helped reassure Malaysia and Singapore 
against the possible return of Konfrontasi-like policies form Indonesia. In 
hindsight, such concerns now seem unnecessary, yet the organisation has 
provided a unique and broadly welcome platform for collaboration between the 
five participating nations. No wonder then that fifty years later the FPDA is not 




Meanwhile Indonesia had been a participating member of the Colombo Plan 
since 1953. This intergovernmental program was launched in 1951 to strengthen 
relationships within Asia and the Pacific and promote partnerships for social 
and economic development of member nations. The program extended to cover 
25 nations including Indonesia and focused on training and education, health, 
provision of food supplies and supply of equipment and loans. By the early 
1980s thousands of Indonesian students had studied in Australia through this 
program (National Archives of Australia, 2021).  
It would not be until early in the next century before a reciprocal 
program known as the “New Colombo Plan” was established in 2014 to ensure 
a complementary program enabled more Australians to study in Asia, notably in 
Indonesia. This program is designed to encourage a two-way flow of students 
between Australia and its neighbours (DFAT, 2019). While challenging to 
maintain under pandemic conditions, so far it has helped thousands of young 
Australians gain a greater appreciation for and understanding of Indonesia. 
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Then there are institutions like the Australia-Indonesia Youth Association 
intended to deepen mutual understanding and trust (AIYA, 2021). 
 
Papua and East Timor Rub Points 
Meanwhile, as Indonesia sought to consolidate its governance and end Dutch 
colonial rule, for a while in the early to mid-1960s, Australia and Indonesia 
disagreed over the way forward with what became Irian Jaya or West Papua. 
Eventually, however, following the “Act of Free Choice” in 1969, the United 
Nations recognised Indonesian sovereignty over the western half of the island of 
Papua and New Guinea. Although the vote has been criticised, ever since then 
Australia has supported Indonesia’s position, although at times Australia has 
pressed Indonesia to exercise restraint in the application of violent force as it 
governs the territory. The concern remains that mistreatment of local Papuans 
can generate political backlash amongst supporters of West Papuan 
independence. The Australia Government has repeatedly stressed its recognition 
of Indonesian sovereignty and its complete disinterest in becoming involved in 
the security challenges there, which it sees as domestic driven and only to be 
solved by domestic elements of Indonesian society acting with justice and 
equity. Part of the reason for some residual concern over Australia’s position 
relates to the different perspectives over East Timor. 
Following Portugal’s internal political revolution and its effective 
abandonment of its colonies in 1975, a political group considered to have links 
with Communist China took control of East Timor. Both the Suharto 
government in Jakarta and the Whitlam Government in Canberra were 
concerned. In sum, the concern was over a possible enclave emerging between 
these two countries that would resemble communist-controlled Cuba. 
Remember, this was shortly after the fall of South Vietnam to Communist North 
Vietnam. The Domino Theory may have been old by then, but it had not yet 
lost its political potency (Silverman, 1975).  
Journal of Global Strategic Studies 





Following a meeting in Townsville in April 1975 between Suharto and 
Whitlam, Australia lent support to Indonesia’s intentions to take over East 
Timor – a move that would lead to its incorporation as a province of Indonesia 
(DFAT, 2000). Little did most people realise the heavy handed manner of 
Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor – a move that saw several Australian 
journalists evidently deliberately killed. They became known as the “Balibo 
Five”. Their brutal killings left Australians, notably including influential 
Australia’s journalists, incensed (Shackleton, 2010). This event and the related 
fallout had a lasting corrosive effect on the bilateral relationship, with many 
Australians sceptical of Indonesia as a regional partner. 
The Indonesian military campaign to control East Timor and remove the 
threat from separatists linked with the armed group that came to be known as 
Fretilin lasted for nearly a quarter of a century, from 1975 to 1999. Along the 
way, former Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas described East Timor as 
the ‘pebble in the shoe’. This metaphor captured the enduring irritant nature of 
disagreements over Indonesia’s handling of the East Timor question (Alatas, 
2016). This was exacerbated by an incident in 1991 at the Santa Cruz cemetery 
in Dili, which, according to some reports, saw as many as 200 people killed 
(Human Rights Watch, 1991). While the numbers are disputed, this damaged 
Indonesia’s reputation, particularly in international settings such as the United 
Nations. Australia maintained its official line of support for Indonesia but 
privately expressed its deep concern. Unlike West Papua, the territorial 
incorporation of which had received full UN endorsement, East Timor 
remained an Indonesian administered territory without UN blessing. 
Eager to bolster ties between the two countries despite these concerns, 
Australia’s Prime Minister Paul Keating and Indonesian President Suharto 
agreed to the signing in December 1995 of the Australian-Indonesian Security 
Agreement. Arranged in secret, the agreement marked a departure from 
Indonesia’s policy of avoiding formal alliances. From Australia’s viewpoint, 
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however, it seemed to represent the completion of a set of formal ties with 
neighbours, matching arrangements already in place with Papua New Guinea, 
Malaysia and Singapore, as well as New Zealand (Brown, 1995). The East 
Timor “pebble” seemed to be an issue that would remain within a manageable 
range and not expected to derail the deepening bilateral ties. That was until the 
Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98 up-ended domestic Indonesian politics. 
As the financial crisis struck Southeast Asia, Australia became involved 
in conducting “Operation Ples Drai”, a humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief operation to provide drought relief to people suffering extreme conditions 
in Papua New Guinea and in the neighbouring Indonesian territory then known 
as West Irian (Papua). Australia deployed 90 military personnel from September 
1997 to May 1998 and provided aid to over 90,000 Indonesians in West Irian 
(Blaxland, 2014). This was accompanied by “Operation AusIndo Jaya” for 
famine relief across Irian Jaya involving Australian military transport, 
engineering and health support (Bullard, 2017). 
“Ples Drai” and “AusIndo jaya” were not the first time Australian 
military personnel had deployed to the Indonesian territory of West Irian.  From 
1976 to 1981, Operation “Cendarawasih” (Bird of Paradise) involved survey 
and mapping of parts of Indonesia, including what was then known as Irian 
Jaya. This had involved Australian Army survey teams and Royal Australian 
Air Force Huey helicopters working with the Indonesian military. This 
operation, and others like it in other neighbouring countries, provided accurate, 
up-to-date mapping and an excellent opportunity to demonstrate Australian 
goodwill (Blaxland, 2014: 43). 
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Howard’s and Habibie’s Choices on East Timor 
The turmoil in Jakarta following the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis saw 
Suharto lose office and replaced by his deputy, B.J. Habibie. In mid-November 
1998, Australia’s Prime Minister, John Howard, wrote to Habibie about the 
situation in East Timor. Howard wrote mindful of France’s experience in 
outlining a ten-year transition plan towards self-determination for the people of 
New Caledonia that led to the signing of the so-called Matignon Agreement in 
June 1988 (Maclellan, 1999: 245). Evidently the comparison with a European 
colonial power contributed to Habibie’ response which was to reject Howard’s 
suggestion of allowing some degree of autonomy for the East Timorese people. 
Habibie decided instead to propose a plebiscite for the people of East Timor to 
vote directly for or against integration – with the ‘no’ vote implying a wish for 
independence.  
The result was a ballot supervised by an unarmed United Nations 
Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET). Indonesia guaranteed security 
for the UNAMET staff, but the militias that formed went on a rampage after 
they announced the ballot result in early September. The international reaction 
was severe and swift. With threats of economic sanctions, Indonesia agreed to 
an Australian-led international intervention force to replace the Indonesian 
military and supervise the transition to independence (Blaxland, 2014). 
Once the international force started to deploy to East Timor on 20 
September 1999, the situation could have been much worse than it turned out to 
be. Thankfully, the day before, the Australia Army Attaché, Colonel Ken 
Brownrigg, convinced the Australian force commander, Major General Peter 
Cosgrove, to meet with the Indonesian martial law commander, Major General 
Kiki Syahnakri. This was made possible because all parties appreciated the 
importance of not allowing the situation to spiral further than they already had. 
Both sides understood that this was a significant downturn in the relationship, 
but to avoid it getting worse required close cooperation. Syahnakri agreed to 
Journal of Global Strategic Studies 





facilitate the entry into Dili of the international force which, in the first few days 
primarily consisted of Australian troops. Within a short while, contingents from 
another 21 nations added to the legitimacy of the intervention, including the 
deputy force commander from Thailand and contingents from several ASEAN 
nations including the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore.  
After the Indonesian military withdrawal from East Timor in early 
October 1999, there were incidents on the border between Indonesian West 
Timor and East Timor. Escalation was avoided thanks to the deft handling of 
some Indonesian-speaking Australians and some cool headed counterparts in 
the Indonesian military (Blaxland, 2014: 143). 
 
Aid, Terrorism and Tsunami 
This low point in the bilateral relationship was followed in 2002 by the Bali 
bombing – a terrible incident that saw 202 people killed including 38 
Indonesians and 88 Australians.  Australia reached out a hand of friendship to 
assist in tracking down the perpetrators. With forensic and intelligence experts 
providing assistance, the Indonesian authorities were able to apprehend those 
involved in the bombing. Other incidents happened in Jakarta and again in Bali. 
In each case, Australian and Indonesian authorities worked closely, realising 
they had more in common than most realised. Slowly but surely the bilateral 
relationship returned to balance. Cooperation reached its highest point up to 
that stage in 2004 with the establishment of the Jakarta Centre for Law 
Enforcement Cooperation or JCLEC in Semarang as a joint venture (Detik 
News, 2010). 
Then, on 26 December 2004, an earthquake in the Indian Ocean 
generated a tsunami, which struck the coast of Aceh. Prior to this point, it had 
appeared inconceivable that Australian military forces would ever deploy there. 
The crisis was on an unimaginable scale and Australia offered to help.  
Indonesia then accepted the offer of medical, engineering and transport 
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assistance. Australia launched “Operation Sumatra Assist” (Bullard, 2017: 292). 
The deployment of Australian naval amphibious ships, carrying engineering and 
medical stores, as well as helicopters, and other aid delivered by air force 
Hercules aircraft, helped provide an unseen benefit. 
The deployment of military humanitarian aid drew considerable media 
attention, but Australia had been providing aid and development assistance to 
Indonesia for decades, working closely with the Indonesian National 
Development and Planning Agency (BAPPENAS) and civil society 
organisations and other community groups. This work spans education and 
scholarships, governance, human security and stability, disaster preparedness 
and risk reduction, emergency response, climate change and the environment, 
regional development, rehabilitation, health and infrastructure (ACICIS, 2020). 
The infrastructure component has been noticeably linked to the Eastern 
Indonesia National Roads Improvement Program and the Indonesia 
Infrastructure Initiative as well as a range of other programs. This tallied nearly 
one billion Australian dollars in just one year (Australian National Audit Office, 
2013). The Australia Indonesia partnership for Recovery and Development was 
established after the tsunami working to a governance board established by the 
Australian prime minister and the Indonesian president (Australian National 
Audit Office, 2013). 
 
Reaffirming Ties 
Australia Indonesia relations improved further with the signing in November 
2006 of “The Agreement between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on 
the Framework for Security Cooperation”, known as the “Lombok Treaty”. 
This provided a treaty-level framework for addressing traditional and non-
traditional security challenges (DFAT, 2010). 
In Late 2010 and early 2011 President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and 
then Chief of Defence Force (now Governor General) General David Hurley, 
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agreed to set up an Australia-Indonesia military alumni association, known as 
Ikahan (IKAHAN, 2012). This alumni network has helped to strengthen ties 
between the two nations’ armed forces. The network of alumni has grown and 
contributed to the establishing of exchange instructor postings at the respective 
military officer training institutions and exchange cadet students.  
In August 2014, Australia and Indonesia reaffirmed their commitment to 
strengthening bilateral relations by signing a Joint Understanding in 
implementation of the Lombok Treaty (DFAT, 2014). This allowed for the 
development of supporting mechanisms for formal two-plus-two dialogue 
meetings between their respective defence and foreign ministers (Parameswaran, 
2018). 
The 2014 Joint Understanding laid important groundwork for the 
creation of a sub-regional defence ministers meeting on counter-terrorism held 
in Perth, Western Australia, in February 2018 that was intended to enhance 
regional cooperation to counter terrorism (Payne, 2018). 
 
Further Disruptions 
Still, significant albeit temporary interruptions have made managing the 
bilateral relationship sometimes tricky. This includes a temporary ban placed on 
live cattle trade from Australia to Indonesia in 2011, following a television 
documentary showing cruelty to animals in an abattoir in Indonesia 
(Willingham & Allard, 2011). 
In 2013, then Prime Minister Tony Abbott insisted on pushing back 
boats carrying refugees – a move which caused resentment in Indonesia and a 
disruption to people smuggling networks operating there (Bachelard, 2014). 
That same year, revelations from Edward Snowden’s cache of documents 
indicated the Indonesian phone networks were being monitored (Dorling & 
Bachelard, 2014). Indonesia’s president responded graciously in public, mindful 
Australian intelligence had helped address domestic terrorist incidents including 
Journal of Global Strategic Studies 





the Bali bombings, but he was understandably upset about this act. The matter 
was not helped by Abbott’s refusal to provide an abject apology (Bachelard, 
2013). Indonesia recalled its ambassador in protest, and the gradual build-up of 
trust was damaged by these events (Davidson & Weaver, 2013). 
Sometime later, Abbott appealed for clemency for convicted criminals 
Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran (ABC News, 2015). Not surprisingly, 
his appeal was ignored. This followed an early incarceration in 2005 of 
Australian convicted drug smuggler, Schapelle Corby in Bali. Eventually, on 
appeal, her sentence was reduced and she was released on parole in 2014 and 
later allowed to return to Australia in May 2017 (Bachelard, 2014). Australia’s 
blunt diplomacy had a blow-back effect. Hopefully the lesson has been learned 
that mutual respect is of fundamental importance to constructive bilateral 
relations. 
Then in early 2017, Indonesian military chief, General Gatot Nurmantyo 
suspended cooperation over apparently offensive material observed on a training 
exercise by Indonesian soldiers training in Australia (Wood, 2017). His actions 
reflected a build-up of resentment over cultural insensitivity and a certain 
apparent Australian high handed, and heavy handed interaction. Australia 
needs to do better. So does Indonesia. Thankfully, Nurmantyo’s successor is less 
conspiratorial and adversarial in his disposition towards Australia.  
These incidents point to some short sighted and unfortunate 
complications to the bilateral relationship and to the need to work to deepen and 
strengthen ties if these kinds of problems are to be avoided in future. To avoid a 
recurrence both sides need to work collaboratively, showing mutual respect.  
Some innovative thinking and reappraisal is required. 
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Reversing the Decline: Bolstering Security, Trade and Education Ties 
Since the issues of beef, boats, spies and clemency, both countries sensibly have 
worked to put the past behind them and deepen ties for trusted mutual 
collaboration. This has manifested in the Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership Agreement (IA-CEPA), which came into force in July 
2020. IA-CEPA builds on AusAID’s decades-long role in various development 
assistance projects in Indonesia, particularly in the Eastern Indonesia regions. 
The IA-CEPA also creates a framework for Australia and Indonesia to “unlock 
the vast potential of the bilateral economic partnership, fostering economic 
cooperation between businesses, communities and individuals” (DFAT, 2020). 
In view of this multi-faceted partnership emerging, IA-CEPA has the 
potential to add considerable trade and educational links to increase the 
“ballast” in the relationship to enable the “ship” of bilateral relations to weather 
future storms that might arise when misunderstandings occur or when interests 
may not completely coincide. As Indonesia’s economy grows, demand for 
Australian goods likely will increase. Additional educational collaboration 
should be a priority to enhance mutual understanding – particularly in the realm 
of culture and language. 
In the 1990s, Australia placed emphasis on learning to speak Bahasa 
Indonesia. But after the Bali bombings and Australia’s distractions with the wars 
in the Middle East, the Australian nation got distracted. Bahasa Indonesia 
language skills atrophied as Australia emphasized learning languages for its 
niche contributions to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (Blaxland eds, 2020). 
With Australia’s focus on the Middle East declining, and the nation undertaking 
a “pivot” back to its own neighborhood, the importance of learning Bahasa 
Indonesia has returned to the fore. Australian government policy now needs to 
catch up and re-emphasize learning Indonesian. 
Beyond language skills, strengthening the bilateral defence relationship 
won’t necessarily be easy (Schreer, 2013). The days where the Indonesian armed 
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forces were eager recipients of Australian defence aid are past as Indonesia has 
become more capable and self-sufficient. Indonesia will always be Australia’s 
most important regional strategic relationship, but the reverse has not 
necessarily always been the case. Yet these two countries have shared interests 
and concerns that should motivate much closer collaboration. Both face 
considerable exercise of Chinese sharp power and wolf warrior diplomacy. In 
Indonesia’s case that has revolved around contestation over Indonesia’s 
Exclusive Economic Zone surrounding the Natuna Islands. In Australia’s case it 
revolves around challenging China’s attempts at interfering in Australian 
politics. Both countries also have important trade ties with China. Australia has 
a formal alliance with the United States, but both look to the United States to 
maintain its security presence in Southeast Asia.  
In future, defence cooperation should go beyond obvious and simple 
arrangements such as staff exchanges, military exercises or humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief. New creative cooperation is needed in terms 
enhancing capabilities and interoperability – the ability to work together to 
manage the maritime space in the top right hand corner of the Indian Ocean – 
what President Joko Widodo once described as the “maritime fulcrum” 
(Laksamana, 2019).  
 
Figure 1 : The shared space occupied by Australia and Indonesia 
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Strengthening single service cooperation between the Australian and 
Indonesian armed forces also is critical to building trust and to hedge against 
future crisis. Australia’s new amphibious capability, for instance is proving to be 
a “game changer” and provide significant new opportunities for collaboration 
(Blaxland, 2020). Indonesian and Australian forces should consider liking arms, 
getting on board and deploying on exercises and humanitarian assistance 
activities in and around Australia and Indonesia. This way they can build 
bridges, literally and metaphorically. Building bridges (with engineers) in the 
field in remote islands or coastline of Australian and or Indonesia, while 
building relationships between these two nation’s armed forces to enable greater 
coordination, collaboration, trust and respect.  Joint maritime surveillance is 
another underdeveloped area of cooperation and more needs to be done in this 
area, as is discussed further below in the context of sweetening regional ties. 
 
Sweeter Regional Ties 
There is scope for the Australian-Indonesia security relationship to return to the 
level of cooperation and trust that led to the Lombok Treaty in the mid-1990s. 
There is also space for Australia and Indonesia to lead in a sweet arrangement, a 
MANIS regional maritime cooperation forum, encompassing Malaysia, 
Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia and Singapore.  Other countries like Timor 
L’este, Papua New Guinea and the Philippines could be invited to participate 
(adding PPT to MANIS, perhaps). These countries have many common 
interests and concerns and have few opportunities to work together other than in 
the sidelines of other forums, notably ASEAN related meetings. Yet they all 
share the space at the juncture between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, what 
President Joko Widodo described as the “Maritime fulcrum” of the Indo-
Pacific. This concept was introduced in a recent paper but requires further close 
consideration for the idea to become a reality (Blaxland, 2016).  
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A MANIS regional maritime cooperation forum could be organised in a 
number of ways, depending on the consensus of the participating nations. With 
a view to the sensitivities of Indonesia and others, it would be best to start 
slowly. Over time, the forum could generate goodwill and political momentum 
to grow. Ideally the political leadership of participating states would see the 
utility of gradually building up the forum and associated networks of contacts 
and issues covered, broadening and deepening the range of issues shared and 
addressed collaboratively. 
Starting with a second track or one-and-a-half track approach would 
probably be easier, rather than launching into a fully-fledged governmental 
initiative. One way to do so would be to establish working groups to examine a 
range of non-traditional security concerns. 
Topics on which regional representatives could consult, share 
experiences and cooperate are the security implications of region-wide 
challenges including climate change, illegal fisheries, natural resources 
management, illegal immigration, terrorism, smuggling and transnational crime, 
including trafficking in drugs, endangered wildlife and weapons. The forum 
could also focus on improving search and rescue and natural disaster 
coordination. 
That approach would involve collaborative government, university and 
think tank teams from the various participating countries meeting to form 
working groups to discuss a range of possibilities including police, immigration, 
border security, legal, judicial, environmental, intelligence, and financial 
matters. Such encounters could examine shared issues of concern and other 
information exchanges, including on operating procedures. They also could 
consider possible collaborative activities to facilitate closer engagement and 
cross-pollination of personnel, ideas and sharing of experiences. 
Ultimately, this Forum could take regional cooperation beyond the levels 
achieved through the Bali Process and help to better address the implications of 
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a new security agenda centered on environmentally vulnerable communities and 
climate change. 
Eventually, if successful and mutually agreed to, military and other 
security concerns could feature under this framework as well. For instance, 
maritime security measures could be workshopped and collaborative activities 
developed. Efforts could be made to help regional coast-watching aerial 
surveillance patrols to be coordinated, more information exchanged and 
additional police and other liaison and exchange positions established. 
Those arrangements would then enable the participating nations to 
consider coordinated and shared activities. Such activities could gradually build 
up, starting with conferences and workshops, to planning meetings, 
demonstrations and, eventually, actual collaborative exercises and operational 
activities. In time, and with the goodwill and agreement of the participants, such 
activities could utilize a range of civil and military resources to plan and conduct 
a range of related activities together. 
Critics may argue there are too many regional forums already. But 
existing forums have great difficulty reaching consensus. A smaller grouping like 
MANIS would find it easier. Potentially, it could be empowered to bolster 
regional stability in and around Indonesia and the areas governed by the 
affected neighboring states in a way that circumvents the existing consensus-
driven constraints. Enhancing cooperation and collaboration this way, with 
timely and consultative decision-making by participating nations, could 
significantly bolster stability and prosperity in areas of mutual concern. 
A MANIS regional forum wouldn’t make redundant the region’s other 
bilateral and multilateral forums and arrangements. Indeed, foreign ministries 
are already stretched thin with responsibilities relating to ASEAN, let alone 
other forums. With a maritime focus and additional resources, perhaps the 
respective ministries of defence or border protection may be better placed to take 
the lead in engaging with the MANIS forum. 
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With a growing range of maritime and non-traditional security 
challenges, there’s a compelling argument to be made for the countries of 
Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia and Singapore to join hands and 
work together in a new way. This could be something far more than a 
straightforward multilateral forum. With unprecedented and growing 
challenges, there is an opportunity for the MANIS countries to work together 
across a wide range of domains to bolster shared regional stability. The way 
ahead involves respectful, patient, collegial and determined collaborative 
engagement to sweeten regional ties. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite all the ups and downs along the way, Australia and Indonesia are 
indeed at the fulcrum of the Indo-Pacific. They need to work together more 
closely now more than ever for the sake of their mutual economic and security 
interests.  
Australia and Indonesia have many cultural differences but they are not 
natural adversaries. They have common interests and concerns. Australians 
need to invest more in learning about Indonesia and both countries should work 
on addressing the pandemic together and finding a way through to health, safety 
and economic prosperity on the other side.  Some creative engagement is 
required. MANIS is one idea, IA-CEPA provides other opportunities, as does 
the New Colombo Plan and the Ikahan network.  Joint initiatives to counter 
environmental degradation and in response to climate change would help. 
Indonesia and Australia have a shared destiny. Both countries need to work 
hard to make that destiny a peaceful and prosperous one. 
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